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1. Introduction 
 
Governments use a variety of instruments to pursue their housing policies. They can 
subsidize the demand side through cheap loans and tax deductions, they can subsidize 
the supply side through cheap loans to housing corporations, they rely on market 
forces, or they apply a mix of these measures.  
A clear picture on which policies are best suited to attain the objectives of housing 
policy is still lacking though.  
In this paper we will address this question in an empirical way. 
The purpose is to approach governement intervention in the housing sector from the 
viewpoints of effectiveness and efficiency. 
Effectivity addresses the question whether housing policy is succesful in attaining its 
objectives. We mean by the objectives of housing policy that affordable housing at 
reasonable quality is made available to all. Federcasa (2006) supplies the statistics 
that allow us to measure these success indicators for housing policy for the member 
states of the European Union. 
Using availability indicators (such as the number of dwellings, the types of dwellings, 
kind of tenure, the vacancy rate, the number of persons per dwelling, the number of 
rooms per dwelling, etc.), affordability indicators (such as the share of housing 
consumption in gdp, rent indexes, the share of households with a heavy financial 
burden due to housing cost) and quality indicators (the average useful floor area per 
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dwelling and per person, the presence of bath or shower and of hot running water, the 
share of highrise appartments, etc.) global indicators can be constructed that make 
visible how effective European governments are in reaching the targets of their 
housing policy. 
Second step is efficiency. We focus on productive efficiency, meaning that 
administration and production costs are possibly too high given the ouput. Again 
Federcasa (2006) supplies statistics that enable us to construct indices for the 
government input into housing policy. 
Applying the methodology of the Full Disposable Hull/Data Envelopment Analysis 
(Afonso e.a. 2003) then allows us to point out the countries with the most efficient 
housing policy. By focusing on the particular mix of instruments these countries are 
using we can then draw policy conclusions.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the policy problem that 
confronts government in the area of housing and the instruments government has at its 
disposal to handle housing market failures. Section 3 briefly reviews the methodology 
and literature on the use of FDH and DEA in the government domain. Section 4 
focuses on the output data for housing policy, while section 5 does the same for the 
input data. In section 6 the efficiency analysis using FDH and DEA is made. Section 7 
applies Tobit regressions in order to gain insight into the explanations for the reported 
effectiveness and efficiency scores. Finally, section 8 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Government intervention in the housing market  
 
The intervention of government in the housing market can be rationalized using the 
classical arguments from welfare economics (Rosen 1985, Arnott 2008). Firstly the 
housing market fails in some respect, secondly the outcome of the market, even if this 
outcome would be Pareto optimal, is not accepted from an equity point of view. 
Housing markets failure usually come under the sign of externalities.  
Positive externalities are at stake when maintenance decisions made by dwelling 
owners and tenants do not take into account the pleasure of a well maintained house 
or garden bestowed on passers-by and neighbours. However this argument can only 
be of limited validity in explaining the important government intervention in housing. 
Negative externalities refer to effects of bad dwelling situations on health, crime, 
social exclusion,... Rosen (1985) correctly points out however that the housing 
situation may not be the real problem here but is only an effect of a deeper lying 
poverty problem. 
Correcting these market failures leaves us with a second problem. The market 
solution may be efficient in terms of Pareto optimality, but nevertheless it can still be 
a solution which is unacceptable to society because of equity considerations. Rosen 
(1985) points at the objective of a more egalitarian income distribution. More to the 
point is the observation that the housing market is not succesful in offering every 
citizen an affordable and suitable dwelling (Maclennan & Rose 1997, Arnott 2008). 
The market usually falls short for low income households. Lower incomes tend to fall 
out of the private housing market and fall or remain into misery. This phenomenon 
has many faces: unacceptable quality of the dwelling, unsuitable and unlivable 
dwellings, cramped living quarters, living on campsites, unaffordable rents and real 
estate prices, homelessness, squatting,... 
The regular answer to this problem is given by the second theorem of welfare 
economics. Through the use of lump sum taxes a more preferred Pareto optimum can 
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be reached. In practice this solution is generally not working so well. In this respect  
Arnott (2008) points at the theory of optimal economic policy under asymmetric 
information. Because of asymmetric information governments have no clear view 
which individuals or households are in need of a general lump sum transfer. Therefore 
more targeted policies, like social housing programmes, are in practice better suited to 
solve the equity problem. 
Thus, in this rationale and in terms of public goods theory, housing has features of a 
merit good. It is in itself not a public good as housing is perfectly excludable and rival 
in consumption. In the same way as education or health however the supply of 
housing through the market is not considered to be sufficient from a social point of 
view, requiring government intervention. Insufficient provision of housing, both in a 
quantitative and qualitative sense, by the market has negative externalities in terms of 
social exclusion, negative effects on the health of the population, pauperization, 
deprivation, criminalization, etc. 
 
 
Graph 1: Intervention in the housing market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government has then several methods to intervene. Oxley (2000) provides us with a 
long list of possible instruments, ranging from, i.a., housing vouchers or allowances 
over housing consumption credit support and subsidization of housing supply with or 
without price and allocation conditions to state supply with or without market 
allocation. 
The impact of these instruments can be illustrated using graph 1. In this graph market 
equilibrium is reached with price Pm and quantity Qm. At this equilibrium point there 
is a shortage of dwellings of QmQneeded to the effect that part of the population is 
lacking a proper dwelling place. 
The government can then intervene to alleviate the housing need by 
- stimulating housing supply through subsidies, own production, cheap loans,... 
which shifts supply to the right and makes for a new equilibrium in point 
(Paffordable,Qneeded); the effort per dwelling required by government is the 
difference between Psubsidized and Paffordable; 
- supporting demand for housing through housing subsidies and/or tax 
deductions shifting demand to the right; again the effort required by 
government is the difference between Psubsidized and Paffordable; 
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- regulating the price of living by fixing it at Paffordable; without further 
government intervention supply drops to Qaffordable and government is forced to 
subsidize demand, supply or both; 
- adopting a mix of the abovementioned measures. 
 
 
Government intervention has a number of effects in terms of welfare economics. We 
illustrate them for a supply side subsidy by using graph 2. 
 
 
Graph 2: Welfare economic effects of government intervention in the housing market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The supply side subsidy costs for the government is given by the rectangle 
PaffordablePsubsidizedbc. There is an increase in producer surplus of PmPsubsidizedba while 
consumer surplus increases with PmPsubsidizedca. The net effect of these three changes 
is the triangle abc and corresponds to the deadweight loss. The housing policy thus 
entails a cost to society in terms of a loss in efficiency. For a democracy this can be 
perfectly desirable and justified. 
 
Graphs 1 and 2 depict a world in which the government is perfectly capable of 
quantifying and remedying the housing problems. Even then there is a negative effect 
on the efficiency of the housing market. Moreover and obviously this partial 
equilibrium approach does not take into account effects of the government 
intervention on other markets. 
 
A perfect remedy for a policy problem is rare. Usually market failure is followed by 
government failure causing extra losses on top of the inevitable efficiency losses. 
Government failure can be approached from several points of view. 
 
A first viewpoint is the effectiveness of government intervention. The central point 
here is whether policy is succesful in meeting its objectives. With respect to housing 
policy the task is to find out whether there is affordable and suitable housing for 
everyone. This is mainly an empirical and practical task.  Afonso e.a. (2003) have set 
the tone for this approach for the general government sector. 
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A second viewpoint is efficiency. Regardless of whether the objectives are met, there 
has been an input of resources, taxpayers money by the government. In principle the 
efficiency relationship between inputs and outputs can be analyzed.  
There are two kinds of possible inefficiencies (Pestieau 2006). 
The first one is productive inefficiency and becomes visible through administrative 
and production costs which are too high. The  reference for this phenomenon in the 
government sector is Afonso e.a. (2003). 
The second one is distributive inefficiency, which means that the government efforts 
do not or insufficiently reach the targeted groups, while non-targeted groups 
unintendedly profit from these efforts. This phenomenon is known in Flanders as the 
Matthew effect,at least as far as social spending is concerned (Deleeck 2008). Romijn 
& Besselink (2008) analyse the phenomenon for the Dutch housing rental market. 
 
In this paper we will focus on the effectiveness and productive efficiency of housing 
policies. 
 
 
3. Effectiveness and efficiency of government spending 
 
The challenge is to find a way to operationalize the insights about effectiveness and 
productive efficiency.  
A useful literature for that matter, using techniques such as Free Disposable Hull 
(FDH) analysis and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), has been around for a while. 
These techniques are well known in operational analysis and especially DEA has 
known thousands of applications in the business environment. Also non-profit or 
public organizations that convert inputs into outputs have been the subject of studies 
in this vein (see Pestieau (2006) for an overview). Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998), 
Sengupta (2000), Thanassoulis (2001) and Simar and Wilson (2003) give good 
introductions into these techniques. 
The application of these techniques to aggregate levels whereby the performance of 
government policies and even entire governments are compared  has been a recent 
development however. In the recent decade the work by Afonso a.o. (2003) has 
triggered a body of studies. Beside studies that look at the efficiency of governments 
as a whole (Afonso a.o. 2003, Afonso a.o. 2005), especially education and health 
haven been analyzed (Afonso & St. Aubyn (2006), Badescu (2006), Eugene (2008)).  
 
To our knowledge housing policies have never been analyzed in this way. Closest 
come studies such as Buckley & Tsenkova (2001) and Lux (2003). 
Buckley & Tsenkova (2001) develop a set of indicators of performance and policy for 
transition economies. The context in which they use these indicators is different from 
ours. They explore the dynamics of housing market systems in thirteen socialist 
economies. Their data set is totally different from ours. They do not use FDH, DEA 
or similar technique. 
Lux (2003) explicitly addresses efficiency and effectiveness of housing policies in six 
Central and Eastern european countries. His approach is descriptive. Like Buckley & 
Tsenkova (2001) he is mainly concerned with the dynamics of policies. 
 
In what follows we will give a non-technical, intuitive description of the FDH and 
DEA techniques and the way they are applied on a aggregate level. 
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In a first step the effectiveness of government spending is analyzed and in two further 
steps efficiency is analyzed. 
Afonso (2003) construct seven subindicators for the performance of government. The 
first four reflect the core objectives of governments and the related spending: a well 
functioning government administration (measured using statistics on corruption, red 
tape, quality of the judiciary and the size of the underground economy),  a well 
educated population (measured by enrollment in secundary education and by OECD 
education attainment indicators), a healthy population (measured by infant mortality 
and life expectancy) and a good public infrastructure (measured by communciation 
and transport infrastructure quality). The other three subindicators reflect the classical 
Musgravian government functions: redistribution (proxied by the income share of the 
40 % poorest households), stabilisation (measured by the variation in growth and 
inflation rates) and allocation (measured by gdp per capita, gdp growth and 
unemployment figures). 
 
For every country in the sample (containing all OECD member states) an aggregate 
indicator is calculated which is the recalculated relative to the average of all countries 
that is set at 1 (the public sector performance (PSP) indicator). A higher figure means 
a better performance than a lower one. 
Next the results are related to the government spending envolved in reaching the 
objectives. The higher this ratio (the public sector efficiency (PSE) indicator) the less 
inefficient this spending is. 
 
In a further step, and this is were FDH and DEA come into the picture, the most 
efficient countries are taken as the reference to calculate an input efficiency score 
(IES) and an output efficiency score (OES). The IES takes spending relative to gdp as 
the starting point. The most efficient countries are given a score of 1. The other 
countries' score is lower and reflects how much resources are spilled in those 
countries. The OES starts from the performance indicators. The most efficient 
countries are set at 1. For the other countries the relative performance vis-à-vis these 
efficient countries is calculated.   
 
The underlying methodology is that of the efficiency frontier which is used both in 
FDH and DEA.  
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Free Disposable Hull 
 
Graph 1 shows a possible FDH production frontier, using output and input indicators.   
 
Graph 1: The efficiency frontier in the FDH and DEA approach 
 
 
Source: Afonso & St. Aubyn, 2005. 
 
The public spending of countries A, B, C and D is shown on the horizontal axis. On 
the vertical axis their output score is set out. The four countries are situated at 
different positions in the graph, meaning that the efficiency differs between countries. 
Country D for example uses more input than country C while it's output is less. Thus 
D is less efficient than C. Country C is on the efficiency frontier, which means that 
there are no countries that provide the same output as country C with less input. 
Countries A and B also are on the efficiency frontier. The inefficiency of country D 
can be measured by taking the vertical distance between point D and the efficiency 
frontier. In the graph this distance is 5 units. This approach is called the output 
orientation because the actual output is compared to the potential output. The input 
orientation looks at efficiency in terms of the spending and takes the horizontal 
distance between point D and the efficiency frontier. In the graph this distance is 300 
which let us conclude that the inefficiency is about 24 % (=300/1300) of total 
spending. By comparing each individual country with the efficiency frontier a country 
ranking is possible. 
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Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
Another non parametric method is DEA. The most important difference with FDH is 
that DEA allows for a convex efficiency frontier. It also allows for variable returns. 
In FDH suboptimal countries are compared to 'real' countries, while in DEA the 
comparison is to a 'virtual' country. In DEA the points of reference on the efficiency 
frontier do not belong to a real country, but are calculated using the equation of the 
straight line between the two neighbouring real countries. 
 
In graph 1 the efficiency frontier is given along DEA lines There is an efficiency 
frontier with constant returns (DEA CR frontier). This line goes through the origin 
and passes A. With variable returns the efficiency frontier turns right at A to pass 
through C (DEA VR frontier). 
Compared to FDH country B has now become inefficient, while it was efficient under 
FDH. With FDH more countries will be considered as efficient than with DEA. 
Countries that are efficient under FDH are not necessarily efficient under DEA, while 
a DEA efficient country will also be FDH efficient (Afonso, St. Aubyn, 2004). 
 
 
4. Output data for housing policy 
 
A reasonable objective for housing policy is to guarantee sufficient housing at a 
reasonable price. Maclennan a.o. (1996) state that 'accessibility, affordability and 
quality have been at the core of European housing policies and they remain important 
concerns.' 
Accessibility involves access to adequate housing, including management and 
maintaining services. We prefer to translate this objective into availability, implying a 
sufficient supply of housing. 
Affordability aims at restricting the burden of housing payments.  
The quality objective has to do with the standards of construction and maintenance. 
For all three objectives it is clear that lower income households are the main targets, 
since government intervention in housing is mostly done out of equity considerations 
(see section 2). 
 
This means that the data on the output of the housing policy should ideally deal with 
the quality, availability and affordability. For a period of time such data are available 
for the member states of the European Union. In 1991 the first 'Housing statistics in 
the European Union' were published. The most recent edition covers data for the 25 
countries that belonged to the European Union in 2005/2006 (Federcasa 2006).  The 
quality of the data is not always very high. Indicators are not always reported for all 
countries, sometimes data are lacking for a given year and replaced with data of 
another year.  
The data reported by Federcasa (2006) are usually non monetary scores (m2 per 
dwelling, the number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants, the percentages of 
households with financial problems due to housing costs,...). The data usually cover 
the years 2003 and 2004. 
Firstly, they are rescaled such that a larger score also means a better score in terms of 
quality, availability and affordability. 
Secondly there is the problem of the implicit weights of the indicators. There is no 
good solution to this problem. Afonso a.o. (2003) deal with this problem in a 
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halfhearted way. Some of their indicators are on a scale of 1 to 10, other ones are 
expressed in percentages of gdp, still others in number of years (life expectancy), for 
some indicators the measure is unclear (quality of communication and transport). 
In this paper we choose to set the score of the best performing country for each 
variable at 100 and not to intervene any further in the weighing.  
 
Another point of discussion is whether the scores should be standardised. Eugène 
(2008) f.i. corrects using the arithmetic mean and the standard deviation: 
 
OSi = (Oi -AM)/ SD  
 
where  
OSi is the standardised indicator for an outcome for country i, 
Oi is the indicator for an outcome for country i before standardisation, 
AM is the arithmetic mean of the different countries considered for this 
outcome and 
SD the standard deviation of the different countries considered for this 
outcome. 
 
The problem with this method is that the recalculated figures do not provide an 
anchor to execute a FDH/DEA analysis and therefore should be rescaled again to 
make that possible. We thus do not standardize our data. 
A consequence of the choices made concerning the data is that the calculated input 
and outputscores and input- en outputefficiencyscores have no meaning in an absolute 
sense, but only have something to say in a relative sense. 
 
We will now go through the three performance aspects of housing policy: quality, 
availability and affordability. 
 
 
Quality of housing 
 
The measuring of quality was done using the following statistics: 
- the surface in m2  per completed dwelling; 
- the occupied dwelling stock in m2 per person; 
- the average number of rooms per completed dwelling; 
- the percentage of the dwelling stock that has a bath or shower;  
- the percentage of the dwelling stock that has central heating 
- the percentage of the dwelling stock dating from after 1945; 
- the percentage of non multi-family dwellings in the total dwelling stock; 
- the percentage of  non high-rise dwellings in the total dwelling stock. 
 
The central heating indicator brings along the complication that in regions with a 
warm climate central heating should not necessarily be regarded as a surplus. 
 
As stated above the score per indicator was set at 100 for the best performing country. 
Then for each country the arithmetic mean was calculated over the number of data 
available for that country. The result of this exercise is shown in table 1 and in graph 
2.  
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Luxembourg has the highest quality of housing, closely followed by the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium and Denmark. This group is within a 
range of 5 percentage points between the scores of 84,7 and 79,8. 
 
Table 1: Quality of housing in the EU 
 
 Quality Ranking  Quality Ranking 
Austria 74,1 11 Latvia 54,4 25 
Belgium 80,0 5 Lithuania 57,4 24 
Cyprus 70,5 15 Luxembourg 84,7 1 
Czech Republic 66,4 18 Malta 62,2 22 
Denmark 79,8 6 Netherlands 82,2 3 
Estonia 57,9 23 Poland 64,4 20 
Finland 74,2 10 Portugal 64,1 21 
France 76,1 8 
Slovak 
Republic 
 
69,4 
 
16 
Germany 75,6 9 Slovenia 73,3 12 
Greece 73,0 13 Spain 66,3 19 
Hungary 68,3 17 Sweden 77,0 7 
Ireland 80,3 4 
United 
Kingdom 
 
82,9 
 
2 
Italy 70,8 14    
 
 
Graph 2: Quality of housing in the EU-25 
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A second group with Sweden, France, Germany, Finland, Austria, Slovenia and 
Greece follows within a range of 4 percentage points between scores of 77 and 73. 
In a next range of appr. 4 percentage points between 70,8 and 66,3 are Italy, Cyprus, 
Slovak Republic, Hungary, Czech Republic and Spain. Then come Poland, Portugal 
and Malta between 64,4 en 62,1. The three Baltic states make up the rear guard 
between 57,9 and 54,4. 
 
 
Availability of housing 
 
For availability of housing the following data were available: 
- the number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants; 
- the percentage of dwellings occupied by the owner; 
- the share of social renting dwellings in the total dwelling stock; 
- share of households not living in overcrowded houses for the income group 
lower than 60 % of the median income; 
- share of households owning their accommodation for the income group lower 
than 60% of the median income of all households. 
Again all data were rescaled by setting the country with the maximum score at 100. 
Per country the average was taken for the available indicators. The results are shown 
in table 2 and graph 3. 
 
 
Graph 3: Availability of housing 
 
 
 
 
Compared to the quality score it stands out that completely other countries head the 
ranking. The three Baltic states now are in the top ten with Lithuania in first place. 
Also Malta is in the top places (third), while the Netherlands are at the back. 
Further point of interest is that the differences between countries are larger for 
availability than for quality. The range between head and tail is more than 50 
percentage points, while in quality the range was only 3 percentage points. 
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Table 2: Availability of housing 
 
 Availability Ranking  Availability Ranking 
Austria 37,8 21 Latvia 53,8 9 
Belgium 44,0 16 Lithuania 85,5 1 
Cyprus 77,0 2 Luxembourg 49,9 11 
Czech 
Republic 45,3 15 Malta 68,5 3 
Denmark 37,0 22 Netherlands 35,7 23 
Estonia 64,5 6 Poland 40,8 20 
Finland 42,7 18 Portugal 60,9 7 
France 42,4 19 
Slovak 
Republic 51,1 10 
Germany 35,5 24 Slovenia 67,5 5 
Greece 54,9 8 Spain 67,9 4 
Hungary 45,6 14 Sweden 33,7 25 
Ireland 47,7 13 
United 
Kingdom 43,0 17 
Italy 48,9 12    
 
 
 
Affordability of housing 
 
For affordability only two indicators are available.   
The first is the share of households without financial burden due to housing cost. Like 
before the country with the highest score was set at 100.  
A second indicator was constructed using the relative price level indices for housing 
costs (gross rent, fuel and power) and the relative price level for total consumption. 
For both indexes the EU-25 mean was set at 100, the total consumption index was 
then divided by the index for housing costs and the country with the highest index 
(the country where housing costs are cheapest compared to the general price level) 
was set at 100. 
The affordability indicator is then the average of the two scores. 
 
Graph 4: Affordability of housing 
 
 
 
Malta has the highest score in affordability and Italy the worst (see table 3 and graph 
4). The difference between them is large, appr. 64 percentage points.  
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The first seven countries in the ranking belong to the new member states: Malta, 
Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Latvia. Probably 
the communist past when housing was provided free by the government is still a 
factor here. Behind this group are Denmark, Netherlands and UK. At the bottom there 
is besides Italy also Spain and Sweden. The low position of Italy is due to the high 
burden of housing costs. Only a very small share of houeseholds does not have any 
problemes in financing their household costs. 
Focusing on the relative price of housing we see the same countries at the top of the 
ranking as in the total affordability ranking (see table 4). Only Portugal has also 
relatively cheap housing. 
  
 
Table 3: Affordability of housing 
 
Austria 63,41 16 
Belgium 60,58 19 
Cyprus 71,67 11 
Czech Republic 85,61 4 
Denmark 76,97 8 
Estonia 71,13 12 
Finland 69,71 13 
France 68,61 14 
Germany 58,41 20 
Greece 63,30 17 
Hungary 83,21 5 
Ireland 54,79 21 
Italy 36,30 25 
Latvia 80,58 7 
Lithuania 98,76 2 
Luxembourg 53,91 22 
Malta 100,00 1 
Netherlands 76,37 9 
Poland 91,16 3 
Portugal 62,81 18 
Slovak Republic 81,11 6 
Slovenia 64,42 15 
Spain 46,48 23 
Sweden 45,14 24 
United Kingdom 72,27 10 
 
Table 4: Relative price of housing 
 
 price level  price level 
Malta 100,00 Spain 65,35 
Lithuania 98,76 Greece 65,12 
Poland 91,16 Slovenia 64,42 
Portugal 87,85 Sweden 59,39 
Czech Republic 85,61 Denmark 59,02 
Slovak Republic 84,12 Finland 58,53 
Hungary 83,21 Belgium 58,47 
Latvia 80,58 France 56,18 
United Kingdom 74,98 Germany 54,73 
Cyprus 71,67 Ireland 54,50 
Estonia 71,13 Netherlands 52,73 
Italy 68,87 Luxembourg 49,45 
Austria 67,71   
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Total output score 
 
The country which best attains the general objectives of housing policy is Lithuania.  
 
Graph 5: Total output score 
 
 
Table 5: Total output score 
 
 quality availability affordability 
average 
score Rank 
Austria 74,1 54,5 63,4 64,0 21 
Belgium 80,0 62,8 60,6 67,8 14 
Cyprus 70,5 75,9 71,7 72,7 3 
Czech Republic 66,4 44,8 85,6 65,6 18 
Denmark 79,8 56,4 77,0 71,1 6 
Estonia 57,9 63,4 71,1 64,2 20 
Finland 74,2 60,7 69,7 68,2 10 
France 76,1 59,3 68,6 68,0 12 
Germany 75,6 52,8 58,4 62,3 23 
Greece 73,0 70,1 63,3 68,8 9 
Hungary 68,3 52,1 83,2 67,9 13 
Ireland 80,3 64,6 54,8 66,6 17 
Italy 70,8 61,4 36,3 56,2 25 
Latvia 54,4 52,9 80,6 62,6 22 
Lithuania 57,4 83,9 98,8 80,0 1 
Luxembourg 84,7 69,2 53,9 69,3 7 
Malta 62,2 67,7 100,0 76,6 2 
Netherlands 82,2 55,3 76,4 71,3 5 
Poland 64,4 40,2 91,2 65,2 19 
Portugal 64,1 80,1 62,8 69,0 8 
Slovak Republic 69,4 50,2 81,1 66,9 16 
Slovenia 73,3 66,8 64,4 68,2 11 
Spain 66,3 88,1 46,5 67,0 15 
Sweden 77,0 50,9 45,1 57,7 24 
United Kingdom 82,9 62,0 72,3 72,4 4 
 15 
 
It's average score is 80. Next comes Malta with a score of 76,6. 21 out of the 25 
countries that were examined reach a score in a range of 10 percentage points 
between 72,7 and 62,3. Sweden and Italy close the ranking with resp. 57,7 and 56,2. 
 
The question can be asked whether there is a relationship between the constituting 
part of the outputscore, f.i. an inverse relationship between the quality and the 
affordability can be imagined. In table 6 we report the correlation between the three 
indicators. Between quality and affordablility there is indeed a significant correlation 
with a coefficient of -0,47. 
 
Table 6: Correlation between scores 
 
Correlation Quality Affordability Availability 
Quality 1   
Affordability -0,47* 1  
Availability -0,13 -0,19 1 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
5. Input data for housing policy 
 
Maclennan a.o. (1996) already pointed at the very high diversity in the levels and 
forms of government intervention in housing in the European Union. He reports on 
the one extreme spending figures on housing of more than 3 % of gdp in countries 
such as the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, and on the other extreme government 
expenditure on housing of less than 1 % of gdp in  Portugal, Spain and Greece. 
The diversity is also present in the forms of intervention with some countries 
depending highly on supply side support while other countries choose to intervene 
more through the demand side.  
Furthermore these different choices concerning spending and means of intervention 
are not consolidated. Lux (2003) points out that in the 1980's and 1990's several 
European countries experienced 'reforms of housing policies, significant cuts in 
public housing expenditure and a move away from the relatively expensive supply-
side subsidies towards less costly support through income-tested housing allowances 
(i.e. demand side subsidies)'. 
With the accession of ten new member states in 2004 the heterogeneity in housing 
policies even increased, adding to the picture the transition from almost completely 
state owned housing systems to more market oriented systems. 
 
Federcasa (2006) provides data on the input of housing policy in the EU member 
states. Many data are lacking however, some countries report only partial data, other 
do not report at all. As a result Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia and the UK 
drop out of the further analysis. 
We are left with useful statistics for 19 countries covering the following aspects of 
housing policy: 
- direct supply side subsidies for housing; 
- newly provided public loans; 
- total outstanding public loans; 
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- direct demand side subsidies; 
- total volume of indirect support. 
 
From the reported data it is not always clear to which category the spending 
instruments belong. We therefor consider public loans to be granted by government to 
public institutions in order to provide for affordable housing. New and outsanding 
loans overlap each other. We choose to use the newly provided loans. 
Taken together with direct supply side subsidies for housing we use these data as 
indicators for the supply side of housing policy. 
Indirect support concerns a.o. tax incentives in housing. We consider those as 
belonging tot the demand side policies. Taken together with the direct demand side 
subsidies they offer us a way to quantify the demand side of housing policy. 
 
The original Federcasa data are expressed in euro. We relate them to gdp in order to 
correct for the varying economic size of the countries (see table 7 and graph 6). 
Not surprising, there are large differences in the degrees that countries make use of 
the various instruments. France spends most in terms of gdp (1,85 %), while Slovenia 
spends only 0,09 % of gdp on housing, or 30 times less. 
 
 
Table 7: Public finance instruments in housing policy (% gdp) 
 
 
supply side 
measures 
demand side 
measures inputscore 
share supply 
measures 
share demand 
measure 
Austria 1,46% 0,09% 1,55% 94,17% 5,83% 
Belgium 0,36% 0,05% 0,41% 88,06% 11,94% 
Czech 
Republic 0,21% 0,85% 1,06% 19,76% 80,24% 
Denmark 0,39% 0,78% 1,17% 33,55% 66,45% 
Estonia 0,06% 0,16% 0,22% 27,18% 72,82% 
Finland 0,34% 0,65% 1,00% 34,44% 65,56% 
France 0,38% 1,48% 1,85% 20,34% 79,66% 
Greece 0,67% 0,00% 0,67% 99,65% 0,35% 
Ireland 0,22% 0,00% 0,22% 97,98% 2,02% 
Lithuania 0,02% 0,22% 0,24% 8,92% 91,08% 
Luxembourg 0,00% 0,54% 0,54% 0,00% 100,00% 
Malta 0,14% 0,03% 0,17% 81,82% 18,18% 
Netherlands 0,23% 0,38% 0,61% 37,46% 62,54% 
Poland 0,12% 0,00% 0,12% 100,00% 0,00% 
Portugal 0,22% 0,61% 0,83% 26,03% 73,97% 
Slovak 
Republic 0,33% 0,31% 0,65% 51,40% 48,60% 
Slovenia 0,08% 0,02% 0,09% 83,68% 16,32% 
Spain 0,00% 0,45% 0,45% 0,00% 100,00% 
Sweden 0,07% 1,11% 1,19% 6,31% 93,69% 
 
Some countries almost exclusively turn to the supply side: Austria, Greece, Ireland, 
Poland. Other countries almost exclusively choose demand side instruments: 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Spain. 
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Graph 6: Inputscores 
 
 
 
 
6. Efficiency analysis 
 
In this section we integrate output and input data. This should allow us to gain insight 
in the efficiency of the policies that have been followed. 
 
Output-input scores 
 
A first and simple approach to the efficiency question is to relate the output scores to 
the input scores. We set the highest scoring country Slovenia at 100 and rescale the 
score of the other countries (see table 8). 
 
 
Table 8: Output/inputscore (Slovenia = 100) 
 
Austria 5,59 Luxembourg 17,42 
Belgium 22,29 Malta 61,19 
Czech Republic 8,33 Netherlands 15,77 
Denmark 8,23 Poland 70,93 
Estonia 38,89 Portugal 11,25 
Finland 9,22 Slovak Republic 13,93 
France 4,96 Slovenia 100,00 
Greece 13,86 Spain 19,97 
Ireland 40,88 Sweden 6,56 
Lithuania 45,48   
 
The results of this exercise are strongly influenced by the strong spread of the input 
scores, while the output scores show less spread. 
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DEA-FDH-analyse 
 
As stated before an alternative approach to the efficiency question is FDH/DEA-
analysis. In the actual context of the data that we use there is only a very limited 
difference between both methods. As shown in graphs 7 and 8 the efficiency frontier 
only differs between both methods for the short distances between Slovenia and Malta 
and between Malta and Lithuania. We continue with DEA because in that approach 
the efficiency frontier is fixed slightly more accurate than in the FDH approach. 
In this approach three countries are on the efficiency frontier, Slovenia, Malta and 
Lithuania. Their input and output oriented efficiency is set at the maximum of 100. 
The input and output oriented efficiency of the other countries is then calculated 
relatively to these three countries. 
For the input related efficiency Slovenia is the reference country for Poland, Ireland, 
Estonia, Belgium, Spain, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Sweden, Austria and 
France. We note a strong spread in this efficiency, reflecting the above mentioned 
spread in the input scores (see table 9). 
 
Graph 7: The FDH approach 
 
 
The best scoring country after Slovenia is Poland with a score of 74,12. This means 
that Poland could/should have reached the same result as Slovenia with 25 % less 
input providing it would have handled this input less inefficient. The worst 
performing country with Slovenia as the reference is France. With 95 % less input the 
same result as Slovenia could have been reached if France was as efficient as 
Slovenia. 
A number of countries (Denmark, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Portugal) have a reference point that lies between Slovenia and Malta. No country has 
a reference point between Malta and Lithuania. 
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Graph 8: The DEA approach 
 
 
 
From the viewpoint of output orientation Poland has as reference point a virtual 
country on the efficiency frontier between Slovenia and Malta. The score of appr. 90 
means that Poland attains 10 % less output with the same input as this virtual country. 
For Estonia, Ireland and Luxembourg the reference point lies between Malta and 
Lithuania. The worst performing country in this group is Luxembourg with a score of 
appr. 73 %. 
 
Table 9: Input and output oriented efficiency in the DEA approach 
  
 
 Input efficiency Rank 
Output 
efficiency Rank 
Austria 5,95 18 79,92 17 
Belgium 22,41 7 84,69 10 
Czech Republic 8,66 16 81,96 15 
Denmark 10,16 14 88,81 6 
Estonia 41,31 6 80,91 16 
Finland 9,25 15 85,22 9 
France 4,97 19 84,95 11 
Greece 14,61 11 85,97 8 
Ireland 41,86 5 84,09 12 
Lithuania 100,00 1 100,00 1 
Luxembourg 18,99 10 72,99 18 
Malta 100,00 1 100,00 1 
Netherlands 19,70 9 89,04 5 
Poland 74,12 4 90,98 4 
Portugal 12,02 13 86,18 7 
Slovak Republic 14,20 12 83,55 14 
Slovenia 100,00 1 100,00 1 
Spain 20,33 8 83,66 13 
Sweden 7,75 17 72,04 19 
 
A large group of countries has Lithuania as a reference point: Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
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Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. They score between 80 (Austria) and 89 (the 
Netherlands). 
 
 
7. Causes for differences in effectiveness and efficiency 
 
After the analysis of the differences in effectiveness and efficiency of housing policy 
in the EU the next step is a search to explain these differences. 
 
We consider the following dependent variables. Firstly the effectiveness as shown by 
the global output score. Next we take a look at the components of the global output 
score, quality, availability and affordability. Last there is input efficiency and output 
efficiency. 
 
For the explanatory variables we look in the first place at the various policy types. 
Does it make a difference whether countries choose to stimulate the demand side 
rather than the supply side? Which choice leads to more effectiveness and less 
inefficiency? 
To verify this in an empirical manner we constructed an indicator measuring the share 
of direct and indirect demand side subsidies in total subsidies. 
Next we have to consider that the success of housing policy can possibly be explained 
by influences outside housing policy. 
The first that springs to mind are the efforts of households themselves. The more that 
private households invest in housing the less market failure there is and the less is the 
need for government to intervene. Therefore we look at gross fixed capital formation 
in housing as a share of gdp. A variant is household consumption on housing as a 
share of total household consumption. 
A possible influence could also be differences in preferences regarding to housing, 
having to do with a differences in climate. In a warm climate there may be less need 
for inside living space. 
To check for this possibility we took as indicator the average yearly temperature for 
the capital of each country. 
A next possible explanatory variable could be population density. A high population 
density leads to a smaller living space per capita, which could be considered to be a 
less qualitative housing situation. 
We also consider living standards. The expectation is that a higher welfare level has a 
positive effect on the quality, the availability and affordability of housing. Gdp per 
capita in pps (EU = 100) is used as an indicator. 
The savings rate could have an influence, more specifically with regard to 
affordability. The higher the savings rate (the gross savings rate for private 
households) the easier it should be for private households to bear the financial burden 
of buying or building a property. 
 
The relevance of these various possible explaining variables was tested by applying a 
Tobit regression. Tobit regression is recommended because of the limit (maximum 
100) applied to the output indicators. 
 
We now discuss the results of the regression analysis (see table 10). 
Regarding overall effectiveness we find a significant negative correlation for the 
savings rate and housing consumption. 
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When we look at the composing parts of the effectiveness score we find a positive and 
significant relationship between quality of housing and climate, gdp per capita and 
population density. There is a negative correlation with housing investment.  
For availability we find a negative significant correlation with housing consumption. 
This time for the policy type and for climate. A deand oriented subsidy policy has a 
negative impact (coefficient -14,46). A warmer climate seems to be positively 
correlated to availability. We find a coefficient of 1,66. 
For affordability we find a negative correlation for the climate, gdp per capita and 
housing consumption and a positive correlation with population density. 
 
Table 10: Tobit regression results 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Overall effectiveness -1,64 -0,25 -0,02 -0,41* 0,01 135,13 -85,65* 
Quality 3,17 0,58* 0,25* 0,02 0,02 -217,35* 36,84 
Availability -12,09 0,75 -0,04 -0,37 -0,03 503,24 -160,52* 
Affordability 3,99 -2,07* -0,26* -0,86 0,05* 119,26 -133,26* 
Input efficiency 30,75 -5,39* -0,67* 0,48 -0,01 525,34 -269,79 
Output efficiency 3,83 -0,89 -0,13 -0,06 0,01 229,58 -102,4* 
 
*Coefficient is significant at 5% level 
1 = total demand side subsidies as share of total subsidies 
2 = average yearly temperature in the capital 
3 = gdp per capita 
4 = savings rate 
5 = population density 
6 = investement in housing in % of gdp 
7 = share of housing in total consumption 
 
For input oriented efficiency we find a negative significant correlation with average 
temperature and standard of living. 
 
For output oriented efficiency we only find a negative significant correlation with 
housing consumption. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we tried to shed some light on how succesful the EU member states are 
in their housing policies.  
In terms of overall effectiveness we find that Lithuania is most succesful, while 
Luxemburg has the highest quality, Lithuania the best availability and Malta the best 
affordability. At the low end of the rankings Italy scores worst in overall 
effectiveness, while the Baltic states have the worst housing quality, Sweden the 
worst availability and Italy the worst affordability. 
In terms of input into the housing policy we find that there is a large spread. France 
spends 30 times more on housing policy in terms of gdp than Slovenia. While some 
countries almost exclusively use demand side subsidies others almost exclusively turn 
to supply side measures. 
Next we turned to a DEA analysis of efficiency of housing policy. The efficiency 
seems to be highest in Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia. The other countries are much 
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less input efficient than these three countries. The output oriented efficiency of the 
other countries varies between 72,04 % and 90,98 % . 
In the last section we looked for explanatory variables for the differences in 
effectiveness and efficiency. We did not find what we hoped for, namely a correlation 
with the type of policy that is chosen by governments. 
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Annex 1 
 
Tabel A1: Original statistics for quality of housing1 
 
 
 
(1) surface in m2  per completed dwelling; 
(2) occupied dwelling stock in m2 per person; 
(3) average number of rooms per completed dwelling; 
(4) percentage of the dwelling stock that has a bath or shower;  
(5) percentage of the dwelling stock that has central heating 
(6) percentage of the dwelling stock dating from after 1945; 
(7) percentage of non multi-family dwellings in the total dwelling stock; 
(8) percentage of  non high-rise dwellings in the total dwelling stock. 
n.a.: not available 
1 the years for which figures are reported vary from country to country and cover the 
period 2001-2005 
Source: Federcasa (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Austria 101 38,3 4,1 98,3 90 25,7 52,1 n.a. 
Belgium 105 n.a. 4,7 96 73 31,5 25,1 4,3 
Cyprus 197,6 n.a. 5,4 99 27,3 7,4 n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 100,7 28,7 2,9 95,5 81,7 24,7 56,5 33,8 
Denmark 107 52,4 3,8 95 98,2 40 38,8 10,4 
Estonia 89,1 27,7 3,6 67,1 59 23,6 68,2 n.a. 
Finland 90,2 36,3 3,6 99 92,3 10,4 57,6 22 
France 111 37,5 4 98 91 33,2 43,3 15,9 
Germany 113,9 40,1 4,4 n.a. 90,8 27,1 53,9 6 
Greece 124,6 30,6 3,8 97,8 62 10,3 40,6 n.a. 
Hungary 94,1 28 n.a. 87,2 52,9 20,8 33,6 23,2 
Ireland 105 35 5,6 94 59 17,4 8,6 n.a. 
Italy 76,5 36,5 4,2 99,2 94,7 24,1 74,7 22,7 
Latvia 92,1 23,9 2,4 67,3 65,2 24,8 70,9 n.a. 
Lithuania 106,2 23 2,5 69,6 71,6 29,5 61,2 n.a. 
Luxembourg 120,2 49 5,5 94,2 92,3 30,8 29,1 16,2 
Malta n.a. 34,3 n.a. 100 3,3 25,9 n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands 115,5 41 4,2 100 90 21,7 31,1 6,7 
Poland 107,5 22,9 3,7 87 77,8 23,2 63,1 38,9 
Portugal 88,9 n.a. 4,3 65,6 3,8 14,4 22,6 21,6 
Slovak Republic 131,7 26 3,2 92,8 74,3 10 51,5 37,5 
Slovenia 108,7 30,9 2,8 92,3 79,1 22,9 28,4 12,4 
Spain 100,6 31,3 5 99 9,4 13,1 47,5 30,6 
Sweden 94 44,5 4,2 100 100 27,2 51,9 n.a. 
United Kingdom 82,7 44 4,7 99 94 34 18,7 2,4 
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Annex 2 
 
Table A2: Original statistics for availability of housing1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Austria 421 51 23 17 46,5 
Belgium 409 68 7 6 59,9 
Cyprus 415 68 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic 438 47 20 n.a. n.a. 
Denmark 456 49 19 3,5 38,7 
Estonia 463 96 4 n.a. n.a. 
Finland 503 63 18 10 42,6 
France 513 57 17 15,8 45,5 
Germany 477 45 6 14,4 32,5 
Greece 500 74 0 23,4 87,3 
Hungary 423 93 3 71,5 n.a. 
Ireland 400 79 8 15 67,6 
Italy 479 73 5 36,7 65,1 
Latvia 403 77 1 n.a. n.a. 
Lithuania 375 91 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxembourg 391 68 n.a. 22,4 44,9 
Malta 331 70 n.a. n.a. 58,9 
Netherlands 422 56 34 2,6 32,1 
Poland 314 57 12 n.a. n.a. 
Portugal 482 75 n.a. 22,8 61,7 
Slovak Republic 318 85 4 n.a. n.a. 
Slovenia 408 84 6 n.a. 89,5 
Spain 462 82 n.a. 18,5 83,4 
Sweden 486 38 18 15,1 29,5 
United Kingdom 430 69 20 5,2 51 
 
(1) number of dwellings per 1000 inhabitants; 
(2) percentage of dwellings occupied by the owner; 
(3) share of social renting dwellings in the total dwelling stock; 
(4) share of households not living in overcrowded houses for the income group 
lower than 60 % of the median income; 
(5) share of households owning their accommodation for the income group lower 
than 60% of the median income of all households. 
n.a.: not available 
1 the years for which figures are reported vary from country to country and cover the 
period 2001-2005 
Source: Federcasa (2006) 
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Annex 3 
 
Table A3: Original statistics for affordability of housing1 
 
 (1) 
Austria 49,6 
Belgium 36,7 
Cyprus n.a. 
Czech Republic n.a. 
Denmark 29 
Estonia n.a. 
Finland 35,4 
France 29,4 
Germany 42,7 
Greece 41,8 
Hungary n.a. 
Ireland 49 
Italy 53,5 
Latvia n.a. 
Lithuania n.a. 
Luxembourg 51,8 
Malta n.a. 
Netherlands 28 
Poland n.a. 
Portugal 49,6 
Slovak Republic 21,18 
Slovenia n.a. 
Spain 56,4 
Sweden 47,9 
United Kingdom 34,8 
 
(1) share of households with financial burden due to housing cost 
n.a.: not available 
1 the years for which figures are reported vary from country to country and cover the 
period 2001-2005 
Source: Federcasa (2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
